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Presidentialism has been long defined as a regime type based on the principle of
separation of power. However, actual presidential systems have most of the times performed
on a very different basis, closer to concentration rather than separation of power. This is
especially the case in most Latin American countries. Ever since Simón Bolívar asserted, as
early as 1826, that “the new states of America… need kings with the title of President”
(Sondrol 1990: 426), the region has been identified by its propensity towards the accumulation
of power in the top executive offices. Hyper-presidentialism, as this phenomenon came to be
called, is at odds with the original concept of presidentialism. I contend that this contradiction
has not been satisfactorily tackled yet; as a consequence, both observers and practitioners
lack an analytical framework able to cope with differences inner to the so-called presidential
regimes.
The mismatch between concept and practice could be solved through either adopting
a different definition of presidentialism or dismissing the empirical evidence as wrong. As the
first choice seems more reasonable, I will start by adopting a restricted definition of
presidentialism and advancing a typology of democratic regimes, just to thereafter apply it to
the two largest South American countries: Argentina and Brazil. I will subsequently locate each
of these countries in a rank order developed throughout the article, and conclude by drawing
some broader implications of the proposed framework for both the theory and practice of
presidential government.
Theoretical framework
Concentration and separation of power
Institutional structures are important for the decisional characteristics that may
accompany them –e.g. the multiplication of veto points (Weaver and Rockman 1993b: 62).
The different shapes that an institutional arrangement may take are called political regimes, i.e.
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6the set of rules that establish the way in which decision-makers are chosen and public
decisions are taken. In this paper I deal exclusively with democratic regimes, as referred to by
Dahl (1989) when defining polyarchy.
Linz and Valenzuela argue that “the most important difference among democratic
regimes concerns the generation and accountability of executive authority” (Linz and
Valenzuela 1994: x). Generation and accountability of executive authority are different
categories, although both are interconnected within the overall system they are embedded in.
There are several ways of organizing the access to, and control of, executive power. The most
widely used category to account for such ways is that which runs from the fusion (or
concentration) to the separation of power.
Although the axis fusion/separation of power is seen as the crucial issue in
distinguishing between democratic regimes, the most widely used empirical category focuses
on the  presidential/parliamentary dichotomy. This is so because it favors an institutional
approach, what increases the potentiality for operationalization, measurement and, thus,
comparison. Rockman (1997a: 60) downplays the latter category by arguing that “the reality is
that the distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems masks a far more vital
distinction, namely the capacity to concentrate or diffuse power.” However, irrespective of
how much one duet may mask the other, they are not the same thing –nor is one less ‘vital’
than the other. The difference between the pairs presidentialism/parliamentarism and
concentration/diffusion is still significant. The choice of highlighting the former dichotomy
stems –albeit not only— from methodological considerations. As Riggs (1994: 75) points out,
“comparison of political institutions should begin with basic regime types, the constitutional
principles that determine how a government is organized.” The degree of concentration of
power, instead, is also determined by political practices and informal institutionalization
(O’Donnell 1996) rather than by formal-legal, i.e. constitutional design.
Concentration of power is not equivalent to stability in power.1 Whereas the latter may
be clearly established by the constitution, the former is usually a function of the prevailing
correlation of forces and historical practices. Moreover, one does not necessary entail the
other. A confusion between these attributes is however frequent, as in the example from the
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7literature on party government that follows. Katz (1987) classifies party government into three
types: bipolar, coalitional, and dominant. The first is claimed to be more stable: “governments
in bipolar systems are more secure. The legitimacy of the government, which flows directly
from its electoral success, is high; no other government could have been formed on the basis of
those election results… Cabinet crises, which only can occur as a result of disunity within the
current majority, are infrequent. Governments are able to consider reasonably long term plans
with some confidence that they will be in office long enough to implement them” (Katz 1987:
13). Still another characteristic is that, when political crises do anyway occur, “recourse is
likely to be had to a new election” (Katz 1987: 14). Such a situation is said to have had place
in the 1974 British crisis, and likewise “the immediate response of a French President of the
Republic facing a hostile national assembly is to call for new elections” (Katz 1987: 14).
However, as cohabitation periods after 1986 have shown, this is no longer the case. By the
same token, Margaret Thatcher’s resignation in Britain and her replacement by John Major
took place without any election being called. Both national cases eloquently display how,
notwithstanding their embeddedness within a ‘bipolar party government’ form, even the
strongest leaderships are not guaranteed stability in a parliamentary context.2 Their presidential
counterparts, on the other hand, enjoy a different situation.
Presidentialism and parliamentarism
Departing from the pathbreaking works by Linz (1990a, 1990b) and Lijphart (1991,
1992), Von Mettenheim appeals to a minimal definition strategy of presidentialism, stating that
“the central characteristic of presidential government is the separate election of the executive
and the legislature for fixed terms” (von Mettenheim 1997b: 2). This strategy contrasts with
others that stress the direct election of executives, while underestimating the separation of
power. This definition coincides with Charles Jones’s (1997) and applies mainly to the United
States.
Riggs (1994: 76) goes a step further, as he considers separation of power not as the
main feature of presidentialism but as a result of a single rule: the fixed term of the president.
Separationism, therefore, is a consequence of presidentialist design instead of its essence.
Such claim opens way to another possibility: that a presidential regime might not be
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8separationist in practice! Since separationism is visualized as a practical consequence, not as a
rule, it is conceivable that a concentrationist presidentialism may develop under certain
conditions. I will argue that this possibility, for long time overlooked, actually takes place in
Latin America.3 The concentrationist subtype of presidentialism would also bridge the
‘philosophical contradiction’ between presidential government and separation of power
highlighted by Lijphart, namely that a “unipersonal president means the concentration of power
within the executive –the very opposite of limited and shared power”  (Lijphart 1992: 4,
original emphasis).
Many authors have acknowledged the differences between the existing presidential
regimes. Nohlen and Fernández (1998: 24), for instance, have advanced four subtypes of
presidentialism: “[1]…reforzado, [2]…puro, [3]…atenuado y [4]…parlamentarizado”
determined by purely constitutional considerations. More refined typologies for assessing
presidential power have been advanced by Shugart and Carey (1992) and Shugart and
Mainwaring (1997). Whereas the former is more comprehensive in accounting for regime
types other than sheer presidentialism,4 the latter is especially devised to cope with presidential
regimes. Moreover, it focuses particularly on Latin America.
Shugart and Carey appraise presidential capacities as composed of two sets of
properties: legislative and non-legislative powers. In turn, the latter are further divided into two
subsets: separate survival from the assembly and control over the cabinet. So-called
presidential regimes are characterized by separate survival and full control over appointment
and dismissal of ministers, whereas hybrid and mixed types –president-parliamentary, premier-
presidential, and assembly-independent— lack of at least one of these characteristics. Except
for Bolivia and Peru, the authors include every presidential regime –understood as that in
which the heads of state and government coincide in the same person— within the broad
presidential category –i.e. as regimes that feature an official called president. It, thereby,
goes from the USA to Nigeria, passing through the Philippines and all Latin American
countries –even Cuba! Such an encompassing typology renders itself of little use when it
comes to distinguishing between full-fledged presidential regimes.
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They call it ‘centralized decision-making’ instead of ‘concentrationism,’ but the argument holds.
4 This framework is so comprehensive that it includes every regime type whose chief of state is called
president, irrespective of his or her real powers –thus including many parliamentary systems.
9Shugart and Mainwaring offer a more suitable taxonomy for the purposes followed
here. They differentiate between constitutional and partisan powers of presidents. The former
are made up of three legislative powers: legislative initiative, decree power, and veto power, to
which they add a fourth, namely, agenda-setting. While veto power is a typically reactive
attribute, the other three pave the way to proactive presidential intervention. Partisan powers,
on the other hand, depend on both the number of parties (broadly speaking, the party system)
and party discipline (relative to party structure and organization, but also to institutional
determinants). Accordingly, the size of the presidential party –or coalition— in Congress,5 the
fragmentation and polarization of the party system, and the degree of party discipline strongly
condition the capacity of the president to push ahead his or her agenda.
In spite of all their valuable contributions, these typologies present some significant
drawbacks. Some are rather reductionist in comparing presidentialism and parliamentarism,
usually generalizing the former from the American case and overlooking differences between
presidential regimes (Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Rockman 1997a; Tsebelis 1995). Others are
deeper but narrower, mainly concentrating on the differences within either type without
providing a broader framework of comparison between types (Shugart and Mainwaring
1997). Moreover, most theories strongly focus on political structures and capabilities –
whether constitutional or partisan— while neglecting effective performance, therefore missing
the impact that factors such as informal institutions and interest intermediation have upon the
overall regime operation.6
The typology I am advancing attempts to address the mentioned shortcomings. In the
first place, it takes into consideration informal institutions and sub-regime working mechanisms,
in addition to formal institutions and party politics. Second, it does not just offer a continuum
along which presidential regimes can be ordered according to the president’s power, but a
parsimonious typology that allows for comparison with parliamentary regimes as well. Within
this framework, the claim that “the U.S. system does not stand out from all parliamentary
systems in its pattern of capabilities, but rather tends to cluster with coalitional systems on
many of those capabilities” (Weaver and Rockman 1993c: 460) acquires greater sense.
                                                
5 In a still exploratory research, Altman (2000) argues that the number of effective opposition parties is
more significant than the size of governing parties to account for coalition formation and survival.
6 Carey and Shugart (1998) and Eaton (2000), for example, have highlighted some differences between
presidential regimes such as the eventual delegation of powers by the legislature to the president, and the
degree to which internal congressional institutions are developed. These are crucial matters, and will be
dealt with below through the case analyses.
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To make my case, I depart from the fact that “both parliamentary and presidential
systems are generic types that conceal a great deal of variation in the extent to which they
concentrate or disperse power” (Rockman 1997a: 25). Consequently, “the extent to which
power is concentrated or diffused… appears to be a dimension relatively independent of
whether the system is parliamentary or presidential” (Rockman 1997a: 27). In Table 1 this
independent dimension finds its place.7 As strange as it may seem, the concentrationist
presidency has tended to present itself as a coalitional executive, at least in South America
(Deheza 1997; Amorim Neto 1998). This occurrence resembles the coalitional
parliamentarism cell at the opposite corner rather than the American model of presidentialism.
However, as will be examined later, it would be a mistake to assume that the presence of
coalition governments has reduced the paramount capacities of the executive vis-à-vis other
key institutions and actors.
Table 1
Typology of democratic regimes regarding executive format
Real concentration of power
Head of
government
Executive concentration Equilibrium executive-
legislative
Yes
(presidentialism)
Concentrationist Presidency
(Argentina) [a]
Separationist Presidency
(USA) [b]
Fixed term No
(parliamentarism)
Cabinet Government
(UK) [c]
Coalitional Parliamentarism
(Italy) [d]
NB: each cell label defines an ideal type, the countries between brackets being the closest
case to each ideal type. Most Latin American countries would cluster just behind Argentina,
while many Western European countries would rather rank near Italy.
In addition to the characteristics proper to the presidential type, the concentrationist
subtype also involves the reduction of veto points, thus potentially increasing the capacity for
individual initiative, rapid response, and executive-driven decision-making. These
characteristics are more likely to be effective in certain policy-areas than in others, depending
on a set of diverse variables. Blondel and Cotta (1996), for example, underline three cases in
which government –the executive— acquires greater autonomy with respect to the supporting
parties: emergencies, technical cases, and implementation. Also regarding foreign policy,
                                                
7 Although this four-cell grouping roughly coincides with Lijphart’s (1995), his second category considers
the electoral system –whereby the assembly is elected— instead of the degree of power concentrated in
the presidency. Hence, his resulting table equates Latin American presidentialism with Western European
parliamentarism, which is at odds with the point made here.
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presidents tend to enjoy greater room for maneuver from both institutional and political
constraints. As Schlesinger (1974: 279) has underlined, even in a separationist presidentialism
such as the American, “it was from foreign policy that the imperial Presidency drew its initial
momentum.”
Beyond their differentiated performance across issue areas, concentration and
diffusion of power also impact diversely upon general governmental capacities. As Weaver
and Rockman (1993c: 454) have stated, “those arrangements that concentrate power… tend
to perform better at the steering tasks of government than those that diffuse power.”
Concentration of power is seen as more able to deal with active policy-making; whereas, its
diffusion is more closely related to maintenance –stick to commitments— and political –
wide representation and social peace— capacities (Rockman 1997b). The application of
these propositions to Latin America may well be a fruitful endeavor: when the region was
suffering from regime instability and lack of legitimacy, concentrated presidencies were unable
both to solve social conflicts and to persist. Once historical causes of conflict had receded –
whatever the reasons had been— and new challenges for governance had to be faced,
steering capacity (effective decision making) developed an increasing importance –sometimes
even more remarkable than political capacity (legitimate representation).
Evaluating concentrationist presidentialism: veto points and veto players
To assess the degree of concentration/diffusion of power I will use the veto player
theory and the agenda setter approach (Tsebelis 1994, 1995, 1999). According to the former,
“a veto player is an individual or collective actor whose agreement (by majority rule for
collective actors) is required for a change in policy” (Tsebelis 1995: 301). Such analysis leads
to the conclusion “that the policy stability of a political system [i.e. the preservation of the
status quo] increases when the number of veto player increases, when their congruence
decreases and when their cohesion increases” (Tsebelis 1995: 322). This is so since “a
significant policy change has to be approved by all veto players, and it will be more difficult to
achieve the larger the number of veto players, … the greater the ideological distance among
them”, and the less cohesive they are (Tsebelis 1999: 593). There are two main categories of
veto players: institutional and partisan.8 While the former are typical of presidentialism –via the
                                                
8 Tsebelis also recognizes other categories of institutional and de facto veto players, such as “courts,
super majorities, referendums, corporatist structures of decision making, local governments and other
institutional devices” (Tsebelis 1995: 323).
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separation of power principle— and multicameralism –usually due to federalism—, the latter
would be typical of parliamentarism and multipartyism.9
Regarding agenda-setting, the property is that “the veto player who has the power to
propose will have a significant advantage in policy making” (Tsebelis 1995: 325). Although the
theoretical argument is impeccable (see also Tsebelis 1994), its empirical evidence is faulty.
Tsebelis claims that “in parliamentary systems the executive (government) controls the agenda,
and the legislature (parliament) accepts or rejects proposals, while in presidential systems the
legislature makes the proposals and the executive (president) signs or vetoes them” (Tsebelis
1995: 325). The latter claim –even if restricted with respect to legislation— is erroneous, the
source of the mistake being the generalization of presidentialism features from the single
American case –incidentally, as do Weaver and Rockman (1993a).
The main advantage of Tsebelis’s formulation is theoretical: it opens the door to cross-
institutional comparison, thus adding refined complexity to a simple institutional analysis. The
main disadvantage is analytical: it is biased towards parliamentary regimes (see Tsebelis 1999),
whether for insufficient data or for inaccuracy in the empirical appraisal of presidentialism. Be
that as it may, its main insights are fairly coincident with those advanced here, not the less
important of which is the counter-intuitive categorization of Italy and the United States as
members of the same grouping (multiple veto players) against the United Kingdom (with only
one).
Italy, the US and the UK may well be seen as archetypes of three of the four cells
delimited in Table 1 –respectively [d], [b], and [c]. To build up a theoretical ground for cell
[a], I draw upon two elements. In the first place, I reinstate a category that Tsebelis
dramatically downplayed after having introduced it as a pillar of its model: the veto player
cohesion. In the second place, I correct his inaccurate perception of presidentialism as an
executive format that intrinsically concedes agenda-setting power to the legislature. Following
these steps, the presidential executive emerges as a veto player “with very high cohesion,”10
which increases its power vis-à-vis other veto players. Furthermore, the agenda-setting power
with which many constitutions –and political traditions— entitle the president adds still another
                                                
9 Tsebelis’s distinction between institutional and partisan veto players remarkably overlaps with Shugart
and Mainwaring’s constitutional and partisan executive powers. However, while Tsebelis considers
constitutional powers as intrinsic to presidentialism and partisan powers to parliamentarism, Shugart and
Mainwaring combine both in order to account for different cases within presidential regimes.
10 Tsebelis himself originally acknowledged this fact (see Tsebelis 1995: 315).
13
determinant factor to out-power the contrasting veto players. Another question can now be
raised: to what extent do the different types of executive format affect governing capabilities?
Presidentialism, due to its usual practice of popular elections for the head of
government, has been said to provide additional democratic legitimacy for the system and,
hence, for the overall decision-making process. This is so because it offers a more direct
mechanism of vertical accountability, together with a greater identifiability (visibility) of its
top official, than parliamentary regimes. The other advantages advanced by Shugart and Carey
–the presence of checks and balances, and the role of arbiter–, however, are not present in
every presidential regime: in fact, most Latin American democracies do not have them. In
O’Donnell’s terms, they lack horizontal accountability (O’Donnell 1998). What democratic
presidentialism features, regardless of its subtypes, is predictability –based on a fixed term for
office that allows relevant social actors to plan their activities over a known timetable.
Contrary to some authors’ claims (e.g. Lijphart 1992), it is often more difficult to get rid of a
president than to dismiss the prime minister of a parliamentary regime. This requires either an
election, an impeachment, or a serious disease. On the contrary, even the strongest chief
executive in the most concentrated and bipartisan parliamentary regime, Margaret Thatcher,
could be ousted without undergoing any of these circumstances. The next section will assess
the extent to which the category of concentrationist presidentialism fits the cases it is
intended to describe.
Presidentialism in Latin America
Table 2 presents Shugart and Mainwaring’s typology to assess presidential powers in
Latin America. While Argentina is undoubtedly located in the ‘strongest’ corner (upward right
four cells), Brazil –since 1988— appears in one of the ‘medium’ corners (upward left). None
of them is currently located in the ‘weakest’ corner, where the U.S. would fit if it were to be
included in the sample. This typology measures potential power, not actual performance.
However, “when observers classify presidents in terms of being ‘strong’ or ‘weak,’ they tend
to mean presidents’ ability to put their own stamp on policy –to get an agenda enacted”
(Shugart and Mainwaring 1997: 40). It thus may be that presidents ‘outperform’ their
predicted powers –i.e. they get a better outcome than expected according to the typology. I
will argue that this is the case of Brazil, and will elaborate it further in the pertinent section.
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Table 2
Relationship between presidents’ constitutional and partisan powers in Latin
America
Constitutional powers
Presidents’ partisan powers
over legislation Very low Medium low Medium high Very high
Potentially dominant
Chile (1989)
Ecuador
Colombia (1968 Argentina
Proactive
Brazil (1988) Colombia (1991)
Peru
Reactive
Brazil (1946)
Chile (1925)
Bolivia El Salvador
Uruguay
Dominican Rep.
Potentially marginal
Costa Rica
Paraguay (1991)
Venezuela
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
SOURCE: Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b: 432.
If it is correct to affirm that presidential performance is affected by party configuration,
the reverse is also true. Presidential design is likely to have an impact on the number of parties
by changing the relative importance of other institutional determinants. As Mainwaring and
Shugart (1997b: 417-8) point out, “although magnitude has been termed the ‘decisive’ factor
in determining the number of parties…, the data sets on which such conclusions have been
based have overwhelmingly consisted of parliamentary systems. In presidential systems the
importance of the presidency serves to reduce the number of parties, at least when the
president is not elected by majority runoff and elections are concurrent. Thus, the special
features of presidentialism override the impact of magnitude.” However, they would “not
characterize magnitude as irrelevant in presidential systems –just less important than the
electoral cycle and the means of electing the president, and also less important than the
presence or absence of party lists” (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b: 418). Concurrent
elections and presidential plurality rule are, therefore, paramount factors in increasing the
partisan powers of the president.
Presidential cabinets also deserve examination, although their relevance is much
narrower than in parliamentary systems. It has been accepted, at least since the Roosevelt
administrations in the U.S., that cabinet members are no longer the main assistants to the
president. They have been displaced by other organizations such as the Executive Office of the
President, especially the White House Office (Milkis 1993). Their members neither respond to
parties nor to pressure groups, but only to presidential confidence. Neither do they need
congressional approval. South American cabinets, by contrast, usually reflect the electoral and
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partisan distribution of power (Deheza 1997). However, formal representation should not
conceal the fact that, frequently, ministers are appointed and dismissed in accordance with the
will of the president.
On top of constitutional –as regards law-making— and partisan constraints,
presidential power may also face another mighty institutional constraint: federalism. The
literature recognizes three main forms of organizing territorial politics in a federal way: the
American, Canadian and German models (Scharpf 1988; Katz 1999).11 Argentine and
Brazilian federalism resemble the American model more than any of the others, since neither
the Argentine provinces nor the Brazilian states participate as such in national policy-making.
Nor do they implement policies decided at that level. In contrast, responsibilities are divided
by policy areas, and federal and subnational governments carry them out autonomously from
one another. The primary characteristic of federalism is “a guaranteed division of power
between the central government and regional governments. The secondary characteristics are
strong bicameralism, a rigid constitution, and strong judicial review” (Lijphart 1999: 4).12 I will
show later on that the only of these characteristics at work in Argentina has been strong
bicameralism –and, to a lesser extent, division of powers. Brazil, on the other hand, has turned
out to be much more strongly federal.
An additional feature often runs parallel to federalism: the degree of independence or
autonomy of central banks (Lijphart 1999). Such independence has not been the case in
Argentina or in Brazil throughout the 1980s. Lijphart (1999: 233) claims that “central banks
that are subservient to the executive fit the concentrated-power logic of majoritarian
democracy.” In the index developed by Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992: 380-81),
Argentina and Brazil are ranked at the bottom of a scale that measures central bank
                                                
11 In the American model, members of the Second Chamber (the Senate) represent the electorate cum
individuals of their respective states; they do not represent the corporate interests of the government of
their respective state. Canadian federalism, unlike the American, does not stem from original constitutional
provisions but has grown out of historical practice. Besides, although the provinces do not empower their
representatives with an indivisible mandate, they keep a crucial veto power since unanimity among
provincial governments is required to approve amendments to the constitution –in contrast to the three-
fourths majority required in the United States. Finally, German federalism differs from the previous types in
that it endows the Länder with competence over national policy-making. While the federal level –in which
the Länder are represented as such in the Second Chamber (Bundesrat)— legislates, administration falls
under the states’ jurisdiction. Politikverflechtung, as it has come to be known –or interlocking politics—
furthermore refers to the “horizontal and vertical linkages among state and non-state actors on the regional
and national levels” (Risse-Kappen 1996: 61). It entails the direct involvement of the Länder in the federal
process of government.
12 It is worth remarking that I am not dealing here with federalism as a way of organizing ethnic
communities but territorial units (see Linz 1999).
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independence in seventy one countries. In contrast, the U.S. is at the top of the ranking
together with other strongly federal countries such as Germany and Switzerland. This contrast
partially accounts for the inclusion of Argentina and Brazil within the ‘centralized federalism’
category defined by Lijphart. Although both countries have conceded an increasing
independence to their central banks throughout the 1990s, just a decade ago presidents still
held paramount authority over monetary policy.
It would be misleading, however, to limit the analysis of South American
presidentialism only to its institutional connections. Von Mettenheim and Rockman (1997:
239) point that, while presidentialism “provides a forum for executive leadership to rise above
the hurly-burly of particularistic interests, this form of government also normally requires that
executives come to terms, at least partially, with the claims of these interests, which are often
articulated in the legislative arena.” Often is not always, though; in South America, large
interest groups have seldom been represented in the legislative arena. Instead, corporatist
pressures and ‘praetorian’ interventions have frequently been directed to the executive in
search of response (Huntington 1968; Collier and Collier 1991). Such a situation increases the
number of contingent, usually not institutional, players while reducing the veto power of each –
as a consequence of greater dispersion. The executive, on the contrary, remains a single,
unified site of power –whereas the state apparatus has frequently been colonized by social
groups. To be sure, this picture became true only once democracy was re-established and the
stability of constitutional presidents guaranteed. As the next sections testify, since that moment
interest pluralism has increased over time, and so has executive power in both Argentina and
Brazil.
Case analysis: Argentina
Constitutional powers
As in every presidential regime established during the 19th century, the Argentine
constitution was a replica of the American. However, its Founding Fathers decided to increase
presidential powers in order to empower the chief executive with the capacities necessary to
drive the process of socio-economic development (Botana 1977; Mayer and Gaete 1998).
The president was thus entitled to initiate legislation, remove or suspend provincial
governments (intervención federal), and declare a state of siege (estado de sitio). Added to
the development of extra-constitutional practices–such as the iterated coups d’état and the
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recurrent state of emergency from 1930 onwards—, these institutional features led to the
progressive strengthening of the executive office.
During the fifty three years running from 1930 to 1983, Congress was at work only
during thirty one years. The executive and judicial branches did not cease to exist as
institutions and managed to preserve a legal13 and working continuity. Although each military
take-over entailed the removal of the president, his cabinet ministers and, usually, all judges of
the Supreme Court, the number of ministers and justices was kept the same. This rutina
golpista induced an extra-constitutional increase of the already strong constitutional powers of
the presidency, since it amounted to a tighter control of the administration while simultaneously
preventing the legislature from institutionalizing any effective supervision –by banning elections
and closing Congress. Even limiting the analysis to constitutionally endowed powers, the
paramount role historically played by the presidency led Carlos Nino (1992) to label
Argentine political system as hyper-presidentialist. Ironically, presidential powers had not yet
achieved their maximum score when Nino coined this sometimes abused category.
It was only after 1989 that Menem’s extensive use of decree power “transformed the
Argentine president’s legislative powers from being ‘reactive’ to being ‘potentially dominant’,”
whereas “the constitution-based classification… correctly labels the Argentine system as
‘reactive’” (Jones 1997: 288). Such a mismatch between de jure and de facto presidential
powers was bridged shortly later. As two analysts have pointed out, “President Carlos Saul
Menem’s tenure, which began in 1989 and [was] characterized by an increasing concentration
of power in the executive branch, consummated in the adoption of a new constitution in 1994”
(Ferreira Rubio and Goretti 1998: 33). Decree authority, hitherto delegated or usurped,
gained strength and legitimacy through constitutionalization. This event crowned the historical
process of strengthening the power of the presidency.
Partisan powers
Regarding the Argentine party system, not only its nature but also its very existence
have long been called into question (Cavarozzi 1984; De Riz 1986). De Riz supported such a
claim on the basis that parties never considered each other as legitimate parts of the same
competitive arena, but adopted strategies aimed at excluding each other. Cavarozzi, in turn,
agreed about the weakness of the party system, yet he argued that it coexisted with a strong
                                                
13 The decree-laws (decretos-leyes) issued by the military rulers would be numbered following the regular
legislative sequence and later recognized as constitutionally valid by the Supreme Court.
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identification of social groups around parties. More recently, however, Mainwaring and Scully
(1995) have classified the Argentine party system as an institutionalized one, according to four
criteria: (a) regularity in the patterns of party competition, (b) stability of party roots in society,
(c) perceived legitimacy of parties as means of determining who governs, and (d) solidity of
party organization. Within this frame, Mark Jones (1997) has not drawn on Catterberg’s
(1989) simplified category of two-party system but rather on Grossi and Gritti’s (1989: 53)
innovative concept of a “sistema a doble partido con intención dominante.” Accordingly,
he described Argentina as having a “two-party-dominant system.” McGuire (1995: 226), in
turn, strictly applies Sartori’s typology to argue that “Argentina would fall somewhere between
the ‘moderate multiparty’ and the ‘two-party type’,” while recognizing some particularities
regarding strong subcultural –rather than ideological— polarization.
Regarding the effective number of parties and party discipline, Argentina displayed
between 1983 and 1989 an average of 2.5 for the former and a qualification from moderate to
high level for the latter (McGuire 1995; Jones 1997). By year 2000, the level of party
discipline has not changed, but the effective number of parties has slightly increased with the
emergence of the Frente por un País Solidario (FREPASO, with a center-left orientation).
For the first time since mass politics was introduced in 1912, a genuine coalition has been
governing since 1999, yet the dynamics of party competence remain bipolar. It is thus
necessary to illuminate the process by which presidential rule and congressional activity have
accommodated to one another.
According to Mustapic (2000), executive-legislative relation in Argentina should be
constitutionally and historically understood as role-complementary, under the rubrique:
“liderazgo presidencial, fiscalización parlamentaria.” She calls into question M. Jones’s
figures for party discipline, and argues that parliamentary discipline was not a given but was
produced by the congressional process. Her figures slightly vary from government to
opposition and from the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR, a center party) to the Partido
Justicialista (PJ, or Peronist party) –showing more discipline in the former case of each dyad.
Nonetheless, she recognizes that presidents have been relatively successful in carrying forward
their agendas, and this tempers the significance of potential party indiscipline. Bipartisan
competition and informal rules give priority to presidential legislative initiatives, which –unlike
Brazil and Chile— lack any constitutional preference. Mustapic concludes by recognizing that
presidential preeminence holds as far as general policies are concerned, while affirming its
19
compatibility with a large room for maneuver by legislators to respond autonomously to their
constituencies respecting particular issues –thus, limiting presidential leadership to a lesser
degree.
As for the cabinet, ministers are not formally part of the executive power (Argentine
Constitution, arts. 94-99). They are advisers to the president and are appointed and dismissed
by him or her, to whom they respond by their actions. The cabinet does not exist as a
collective body, although the 1994 reform created the figure of a Chief of the Cabinet of
Ministers, who is appointed by the president but may be dismissed by an absolute majority of
each chamber. This office is too recent to assess its performance, but thus far it does not seem
to have changed the position of the president as primus solus —nor is this likely to occur in
the short run.
Federalism and other features
Jones (1997: 290) has pointed that, “between 1983 and 1994 the combination of
three (under Alfonsín) then five (under Menem) principal partisan and institutional factors made
the Argentine president extremely powerful: (1) a large and relatively well-disciplined partisan
legislative contingent, (2) the federal government’s strong position vis-à-vis the provinces, (3)
strong veto and partial veto powers, (4) the ability to issue decrees of urgent necessity
(Menem), and (5) a co-opted Supreme Court (Menem).” The first part of this section will
consider factors two and five, since the others were previously examined.
In Argentina, the federal government has historically been much stronger than the
provincial ones. Although it is ranked as the second most federal country in South America,
Argentine figures for central government revenues vis-à-vis the provinces are much higher than
those of Brazil –also government expenditure is slightly higher (Garman, Haggard and Willis
1999). The limited autonomy of the provincial governments has become a crucial factor in
strengthening presidential powers (Jones 1997). Furthermore, the 1994 constitutional reform
that opened the possibility of presidential re-election also undermined the political power
hitherto held by the provinces.14 While some analysts, such as Jones, consider that the reform
could reduce the zone of presidential discretion in the future, this has not occurred during
Menem’s second period.
                                                
14 The reform went as far as to change the rules for electing the president. The new system establishes a
popular and direct election, what greatly dilutes the power previously yielded by the provinces through
their overrepresentation in the electoral college intended to elect the president.
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Analyzing the submission of the Supreme Court to the executive, Larkins (1998)
considers that it is by reason of the ‘delegative’ features of Argentine democracy. Following
O’Donnell, he claims that the lack of impartiality of most judges, along with the broad
institutional scope of their authority, is due to the characteristics of such type of presidential
regime. On the contrary, it could be argued that Menem’s control over the judiciary was built
upon institutional measures, quite similar to those attempted by Franklin Roosevelt and later
American presidents to enlarge the Court in order to prevent it from blocking their policies. It
is true, however, that the subordination of the Court’s judges to the executive was apparent
during Menem’s presidency; yet this was due to the economic emergency, and to the
perception that the president was the only one able to face it. The best proof that
subordination is not an enduring regime feature is that President De la Rúa, when elected in
1999, managed to govern with the same composition of the Court and did not even attempt to
change its members.
As for the use of complementary mechanisms in order to foster the participation of
other social actors, such as socio-economic concertation, Argentina’s democracy has
exhibited a poor record. Haggard and Kaufman (1995: 341) have pointed out, as a general
rule, that “the organizational weakness of the relevant players, including both interest groups
and parties,” makes concertation very difficult –thus increasing the room for the executive to
decide alone. In Argentina, organizational weakness and pluralism were more evident
regarding interest groups–especially on the business side—, while in Brazil it was the parties
that were highly fragmented and organizationally weak.
Throughout the 1980s and especially the 1990s, the pluralism of organized business
interests increased (Acuña 1995, 1998) and trade unions became progressively weaker and
more fragmented. Pluralist concertation failed during Alfonsín’s tenure (Portantiero 1987) and
was informally achieved during Menem’s (Etchemendy and Palermo 1998). Argentina’s so-
called ‘corporatism’ has evolved into a pluralist system of oligopolistic lobbying, rather than
either a traditional or a neo-corporatist system (Ducatenzeiler 1990). Since the executive is
always the strongest power site, it is also the priority target for interest groups –unlike the
U.S., where Congress and its committees offer attractive sites for exerting influence.
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Case analysis: Brazil
Constitutional powers
The concentration of power in the Brazilian presidency is also rooted in the 19th
century. As heir to an empire, the successive Brazilian Republics since 1889 were historically
marked by the central role of the head of government relative to the legislature. However, this
supremacy was not always absolute with regard to the federal units of the country: the states.
Some specialists have even argued that federalism, not the traditional organization inherited
from the empire, is the foundations of the Brazilian institutional matrix. Teixeira Neves de Pinho
Tavares (1997: 14), for instance, argues that “é fato notório que a grande movimentação
política ocorrida no fim do Império teve uma conotação muito mais federalista do que,
propriamente, presidencialista… Sendo federativa a escolha política, a opção
presidencialista foi dela corolário.”15
Just as in Argentina, Brazilian political history passed a watershed in 1930. The ascent
of Getúlio Vargas to the presidency led to a populist, direct relation between the state and
most social actors, in a country that –unlike Argentina— had not yet developed a structured
civic society. The ephemeral Estado Novo, whose institutional arrangements were left
undismantled by the governments of 1946-64 (Stepan 1989), and much later the bureaucratic
authoritarian regime between 1964 and 1985 (O’Donnell 1973; Skidmore 1989), contributed
to centralizing power simultaneously in the state and, within the state, in the executive –as
happened in most of the Southern Cone. However, when compared to similar dictatorships at
the same time (e.g. Argentina, Uruguay, Greece, Spain and Portugal), Brazilian military rule
featured a striking exceptionality: the coexistence of an authoritarian, non-elected executive
with a working –albeit weak— Congress and indirect popular, local elections. However
controlled the latter were, these institutions would condition the democratization process and
its institutional aftermath.
The continuity of congressional activity was parallel, during the military rule, to the
survival of traditional elites (Hagopian 1996). Congress was a channel that allowed rural
landowners to keep alive patronage and intimidation practices, which their representatives
safeguarded giving the national assembly a particularistic stand. The slow liberalization process
                                                
15 “It is a known fact that political actions that took place by the end of the Empire had a more federalist
than presidentialist connotation… Having chosen federalism as the first political option, the presidentialist
option was but a corollary” (author’s translation).
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set off in 1974 led finally to the indirect, parliamentary election of Tancredo Neves in 1985, a
popular politician who might also have won a direct election. However, Tancredo’s sudden
death before his inauguration left José Sarney, a conservative politician, elected vice-president
as the factotum of the democratization process. The reform of the constitution was soon seen
by most political actors as a necessary device for drawing a clear distinction with the past.
The constitutional reform of 1988 granted Brazilian presidents the strongest
institutional autonomy in Latin America (Shugart and Carey 1992: 155; Shugart and
Mainwaring 1997; Deheza 1997).16 This autonomy comprises both proactive and reactive
powers, and provides the executive with more resources than the previous constitution did
(although the latter also established solid presidential powers). The president is allowed to
enact legislation alone (medidas provisórias com força de lei) “em caso de relevância e
urgência” (art. 62 of the Constitution). As Power (1999) sustains, the ‘transplant’ of the
Italian provvedimenti provvisori from a parliamentary to a presidential arrangement virtually
left the assembly without resources to control the executive. The president also holds exclusive
prerogatives concerning the initiation of budget and taxation legislation, and has the right to
demand urgency procedures in bringing bills up for a vote (Mainwaring 1997; Power 1999;
Figueiredo and Limongi 2000). As observed by Tavares (1998: 271), “o resultado líquido
consiste em que o espaço de poder do presidente nesta matéria torna-se praticamente
ilimitado.”17
Power (1999: 222) highlights the continuity of the Brazilian political tradition according
to which “the executive acts and the legislature reacts.” The impeachment that led to the
conviction of Collor de Mello must be considered an aberration rather than a systemic change.
During the democratic period that began in 1985, “executives took what was already a broad
delegation and tried to expand it further” with ample success (Power 1999: 224). Having
reviewed in this section the constitutional basis of such a broad delegation, let me now turn to
the partisan determinants of its further expansion.
                                                
16 As far as legislative powers regard, it was only surpassed by the Chilean presidency under the 1925
Constitution.
17 “The result is a jurisdiction in which the power of the president becomes virtually unlimited” (author’s
translation).
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Partisan powers
The Brazilian party system has been classified as “inchoate,” due to its almost zero
degree of institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Mainwaring (1995: 354) goes as
far as to argue that Brazil “may be a unique case of party underdevelopment in the world,”
since its parties are identified by “their fragility, their ephemeral character, their week roots in
society, and the autonomy politicians of the catch-all parties enjoy with respect to their
parties.” Moreover, the fragmentation of the party system has soared since the inauguration of
the New Republic, increasing the effective number of legislative parties from 3.2 in 1985 to
6.9 in 1997 –and peaking at a striking 9.4 in 1992 (Amorim Neto 1998: 101). Polarization,
on the other hand, was not meaningful in traditional ideological terms. It has though been
moderately significant since the first presidential ballottage took place in 1990, when Collor de
Mello defeated labor leader Lula, and during the former’s following tenure until his
impeachment.
Regarding the actor level rather than the systemic one, Mainwaring (1990: 5) has
pointed out that “the extremely loose nature of Brazilian parties has added to the problems
caused by the permanent minority situation of Presidents’ parties. Presidents could not even
count on the support of their own parties, much less that of the other parties that had helped
elect them.” Although Mainwaring’s claim is coincident with a number of scholarly analyses –
among them, those by Sartori (1994) and Linz and Valenzuela (1994)— and has become
common knowledge, recent investigations by Figueiredo and Limongi (2000) strongly
questions it. They show that party discipline is actually high in the Brazilian Congress –about
85.6% for the presidential coalition.18 Due to institutional variables, “party discipline is
enforced in the legislative arena” (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000: 152) –just as Mustapic
argues for the Argentine case. In other words, “variables internal to the decision-making
process neutralize the effects predicted by the emphasis on the systems of representation and
government” (Figueiredo 2000: 20).
The combination of presidentialism with multipartism has usually been thought to be
problematic for democratic stability and governability (Mainwaring 1993). However, this
combination has become both predominant and sustainable all over Latin America. The
problem has been apparently overcome through the expedient of governmental coalitions.
                                                
18 Analyzing the registered roll calls between 1989 and 1998, they find that party discipline has ranged from
85.0% –for the PMDB— through 98.4% –for the PT. Such figures convey a much higher degree of party
discipline than ever previewed before (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000: 159).
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Coalition government is one of the resources that presidents have in a multiparty system to
build support in the Congress (Abranches 1988; Deheza 1997; Mainwaring 1997; Chasquetti
2000; Figueiredo and Limongi 2000). However, coalition government in a presidential system
is not identical with a parliamentary coalition: in Brazil, “por decisão solitaria, o presidente
compõe ou recompõe o ministério. E precisamente porque a Presidência se define como
una entidade extrapartidária o superpartidária, os partidos e seus representantes
parlamentares não se consideram, em regra, vinculados ao presidente nem responsáveis
por seu governo”19 (Tavares 1998: 261). This phenomenon led Abranches (1988) to define
Brazilian presidentialism as “imperial,” while simultaneously –not contradictorily— labelling it
“presidencialismo de coalição.” In this kind of ‘coalitional presidentialism,’ the president
becomes at the same time the ‘arbiter’ and the ‘target’ of divergences between the parties –
and, eventually, between the regions— making up the coalition. As Ames (1995: 333) points
out in an in-depth study, “because in Brazil the executive controls most pork-barrel programs,
good relations with the president are a must.”
Mainwaring (1997: 75-80) has enumerated how “a multiparty government in a
parliamentary system differs in three ways from a multiparty presidential government. First,
presidents are generally freer to dismiss ministers and rearrange the cabinet than prime
ministers are… Second, (in parliamentary systems) individual legislators are more or less
bound to support the government unless their party decides to drop out of the governmental
alliance… Third, (in parliamentary systems) the parties themselves are co-responsible for
governing”. Presidential coalitions are more unstable, less ‘fair’, and less ‘binding’ –both for
the president and for each participating party— than their parliamentary counterparts
(Chasquetti 1998; Amorim 1998; Altman 2000). This is so because, while the latter depend
basically on institutional rules, the former depend on a combination of institutional rules and
agent behavior.
Mainwaring (1997: 80) reasonably claims that “regardless of the system of
government, party indiscipline is inimical to stable coalition building.” However, Figueiredo and
Limongi’s new data about the high levels of party discipline show that presidential coalitions
have effectively supported presidential initiatives. Such support was fostered by (and not
                                                
19 “The President alone nominates and reshuffles his cabinet. It is precisely because the presidency is
defined as extra-partisan or supra-partisan that parties and legislators do not consider themselves linked to
the president nor responsible for his government” (author’s translation).
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despite of) presidential legislative powers, which the president utilized in order not to
circumvent but to control the legislative process. With regard to the executive structure, the
president performs the pivotal role and usually keeps a positively disproportional share of the
cabinet and the most significant ministries, either for his party or for technicians that respond
solely to him (Deheza 1997; Altman 2000). By these means, Brazilian presidents have
developed along the last decade a cooperative rather than a conflictive strategy vis-à-vis
Congress. Mainwaring (1997: 74) has even argued that “the breadth of the parties represented
in the cabinet obeyed a logic closer to consociational than majoritarian democracy.”
Nevertheless, presidents have not resigned their preeminent attributions. As Figueiredo and
Limongi (2000: 168) shows, “in Brazil the president controls the legislative agenda.” This
contradicts Tsebelis’s case concerning presidentialism, but coincides with the argument
advanced here.
An eloquent circumstance that illuminates the potency of Brazilian executive is the
repeated instance of a president who, not having been elected as such but as vice-president,
was still able to endure and finish the constitutional period without major inconvenience.
Although both José Sarney and Itamar Franco20 lacked popular support and an automatic
majority in the Congress, they could perform their constitutionally prescribed tasks in a regular
way. Their situation somewhat resembled Gerald Ford’s, although American democracy was
never thought to be endangered by a constitutional procedure that, in most Latin American
cases, was previously deemed much more hazardous.
In Brazil, ministers are part of the executive power as in Bolivia, Colombia, Peru,
Uruguay and Venezuela (Deheza 1997). Two cabinet posts are usually considered the
strongest: Finance and Foreign Affairs. Whereas the former has taken the lead regarding
Brazilian economic reforms (and they have been many along the last fifteen years), the latter is
the head of perhaps the most efficient bureaucracy in Brazil and the continent: Itamaraty –as
the Brazilian Foreign Ministry is known. In contrast with the zigzagging Argentine foreign
policy, Brazil has defined a foreign policy direction since the early 1970s and has not failed to
meet it. Whether under military or civilian rule, the predictability of Brazil’s international stance
–albeit not its rigid definition of interests— has become a given.
                                                
20 Unlike Altman (2000), I do not see Franco as a caretaker but as a full-fledged constitutional president.
His position was in no institutional sense inferior to that of Sarney after Tancredo’s decease. Moreover, it
was during his administration that the ambitious –and successful— economic plan of Minister Cardoso
was launched.
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The link between cabinet stability and executive success may be inferred from the list
of policy areas that Mainwaring (1997: 99/101) offers to show the degree to what presidents
were unable to implement their preferred policies between 1985 and 1994. The inability of
presidents was basically limited to socio-economic areas and even this has progressively
changed since then.
Federalism and other features
The significance of federalism in Brazilian politics is larger than in any other country of
the continent. As Tavares (1998: 174) put it, “foi… o federalismo, e não a república, a
idéia força que, associada ao ressentimento do escravismo contrariado, derrubou o
Império.”21 Although Brazilian federalism is institutional rather than contractual –the latter a
feature of the U.S. and Argentina alike— and, therefore, has a constitutional nature instead of
a pre-existent one, the indissolubility of the federal state has not been challenged in practice.
The strength of Brazilian federalism becomes apparent when looking at some key
figures. For example, it is the only Latin American country in which the share of both total
government tax revenue and expenditure are higher at the sub-national level than at the central
one (Garman, Haggard and Willis 1999). As a corollary, central government controls less than
half of overall public resources. This feature of Brazilian politics, unlike those concerning party
system and discipline, clearly has a negative impact on presidential power. Even so, some
authors underline the “executive-centric character” of Brazilian federalism to distinguish it from
the American one (von Mettenheim 1997c).
In spite of the strength of the Brazilian presidency, especially when compared to
separationist ones such as the American, Brazilian federalism is one of the major restrictions to
presidential power (Mainwaring and Samuels 2000). Just as strong federalism undermines
presidential power, so bureaucratic centralization has contributed to empower the presidency
–albeit with legislative assent (Mainwaring 1997). Amorim Neto (1998: 181) affirms that,
“given that the Brazilian legislature in particular, and Latin American legislatures in general, are
weaker than the American Congress in terms of oversight capacity, a presidential strategy of
bureaucratic aggrandizement aiming at bypassing partisan constraints is more likely to succeed
in the former countries than in the US.” The expansion of and control over the bureaucratic
apparatus of the state become other ways for presidents to carry out non-statutory or non-
                                                
21 “It was federalism, not republicanism, the ideal that –along with the resentment of former slave owners—
brought down the Empire” (author’s translation).
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partisan strategies.22 This process and its consequences were so described by Alimonda
(1998: 145-6, my emphasis): “un perfil de actuación estatal que, al mismo tiempo en que
se automutila como estructura y se retira de sus funciones reguladoras, adopta un estilo
decisional altamente centralizado… Esta centralización… implica inclusive un refuerzo del
predominio del Poder Ejecutivo sobre el Legislativo y el Judicial. Así, el proceso de Reforma
del Estado acaba reforzando vicios tradicionales de la cultura política
latinoamericana.”23
Recapitulation
To put it succinctly, the already strong constitutional powers of the analyzed presidents
have been strengthened lately through constitutional reforms in Argentina (1994) and Brazil
(1988 and 1997). Partisan powers, in turn, are remarkably strong in Argentina and, to a lesser
degree, in Brazil. Finally, few other relevant veto players are present in Argentina and in Brazil
(with the exception of the most powerful Brazilian states). Table 3 displays executive
capacities relative to those of other significant veto players.
Table 3
Executive Capacities vis-à-vis Other Veto Players in Selected Countries
Veto players
Concentrationist
presidency:
ideal type
Argentina Brazil USA
(separationist
presidency)
UK
(cabinet
government)
Italy
(coalitional
parliament.)
Executive stability
High High High High Medium Low
Number a
(significant players*)
Low Low Medium High Low High
Congruence b
(other players*)
High Medium Medium Medium High Low
Cohesion b
(the Executive)
High High Medium Medium High Low
Cohesion c
(other players*)
Low Medium Low Medium High Low
                                                
22 This is also the conclusion arrived to by Milkis (1993) regarding the strategies of the American
presidents since the New Deal. However, the American Congress is still much stronger than its Latin
American counterparts.
23 “A mode of state intervention that, while self-damaging as a structure and retiring from its regulation
functions, adopts a highly centralized decision-making… This centralization entails the strengthening of
the Executive predominance over the Legislature and the Judiciary. The process of state reform ends up by
reinforcing traditional vices of Latin American political culture” (author’s translation).
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Agenda-setting d
(the Executive)
High High High Medium High Low
a - Apart from the executive. Low ranges from 1 to 2; medium  from 3 to 4; and high from 5 on.
b - By the negative, ideological or value-oriented distance between veto players (higher congruence =
closer distance).
c - Internal cohesiveness of veto players (average).
d - Capacity to establish the public agenda and/or to initiate legislation.
* Other players refer both to institutional (the assembly, the judiciary, the states or provinces in
federal countries) and non-institutional players (parties, interest groups, exceptionally the military
as in Chile) as developed in the accompanying text.
NOTE: Criteria concerning categories and country qualification are spelled out throughout the article.
The widespread strengthening of Latin American presidential powers, during the last
two decades, was mainly due to the presidents’ strategies to manage the economic crisis and
conduct structural reforms. Building upon a tradition of already strong executives, many heads
of government sought the capacity to formulate and enforce technical measures through
confidential planning and circumventing both public and legislative debate. However, when
consensus was considered to be necessary, presidents proved usually able to build coalitions
in support of their policies.
As the number and consistency of veto players varies across policy areas, so does
presidential margin of maneuver. Although strengthened by the economic emergency,
presidents enjoyed larger room for autonomous decision-making in foreign as opposed to
domestic issues. This was also due to the fact that constitutional provisions were more relaxed
and public interest and knowledge farther away from foreign affairs. Since the president is the
only politician whose constituency is the whole nation, he is better equipped than Congress to
provide the impulse for a policy entailing diffuse benefits and specific costs. This has been the
exemplary case of Mercosur every time that economic turmoil put into question its raison
d’être. For many observers it is clear that Collor “y Menem alteraron sustantivamente los
parámetros de la integración de sus países… Sin duda, los principales actores de esa
historia han sido los presidentes de Argentina y Brasil”24 (Cavarozzi 1998: 13). Cavarozzi
extends his argument to further encompass the two following Brazilian presidents, thus noting
how it was the institution that kept playing a role and not its contingent agents. The link
between executive format and regional integration has also been explored more recently
(Malamud 2000); in a comparative approach to the European Union, Mercosur and the
                                                
24 “Collor and Menem substantively changed the parameters of integration of their countries… Doubtless,
the main actors in that story were the presidents of Argentina and Brazil” (author’s translation).
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Andean Community, the paper analyzes how the shape and progress of integration schemes
are dependent on whether the integrating countries are presidentialist or parliamentary.
Both Argentine and Brazilian presidents were blocked from time to time during the last
fifteen years by governors and congresses. Such blockages did not affect substantially,
however, the steering capacity of the presidents. Even regarding the most obstructive area of
domestic politics: the constitutional domain, Menem and Cardoso managed to have their
respective Constitutions reformed in order to permit their previously banned re-election. Since
written constitutions are admittedly a consensual feature of political regimes, given the super-
majorities usually required to change them (Lijphart 1999), the Argentine and Brazilian cases
show how fragile such a restriction was in these countries. It was unable to prevent
majoritarian-like concentrations of power. The way in which both presidents obtained
Constitutional reform and, subsequently, their own re-election, is revealing about the extent to
which political power is effectively –and increasingly— concentrated in presidential hands.
Some observers maintain the opposite thesis, that is, that presidential offices are not
increasingly concentrating power but relinquishing it to coalition partners. Thibaut (1998), for
instance, compares Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay and argues that only Argentina under
Menem can be considered a case of presidential supremacy, while all other cases are better
understood as having ‘coordinated’ rather than ‘subordinated’ relations, given the president’s
need to reach agreements with parliamentary parties. However, if my argument is correct,
coalitional presidentialism is precisely an expression of concentration of power in the
executive, rather than the contrary. This is so because, in a separationist presidentialism such
as the American, coalitions are not only unnecessary but also contradictory, since they entail a
linkage between both branches of government –and not their separation. South American
presidents build coalitions in order to govern effectively, not to give up the power to do so.
Subordination, so to speak, is achieved through coordination. Whereas in most
parliamentary democracies coalitions are formed as a functional response to the logic of the
system –in order to establish a government and make it function—, in most presidential
democracies coalitions have strategical rather than functional causes –in order for the entering
parties to take advantage of the resources that only the executive holds.
Shugart and Mainwaring’s (1997) claim that the fragmentation of the party system is a
key factor to explain the performance of presidential regimes is significant. At the turn of the
century, both Argentina and Brazil have left behind any (previous or not) two-party format and
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feature coalition governments without exception. However, no presidency seems to have
diminished its grasp whether over politics or policy. On the contrary, as a bipolar mechanics of
competence consolidates, the negative impact of party system fragmentation upon presidential
power turns weaker.
As mentioned above, these countries are no longer an exception to the claim that
“institutions matter.” Presidents have, nevertheless, managed to promote their agendas
regardless of institutional and non-institutional impediments. Presidents have not become all-
mighty rulers though, as the delegative democracy label may have led us to believe.
Przeworski (1999: 15) has spelled out this situation by affirming that, “aún cuando los
presidentes brasileños y argentinos parecieran conseguir la mayor parte de lo que
desean, es dudoso que se encuentren menos restringidos institucionalmente que los
primeros ministros de España o Inglaterra.”25
In closing, I would like to make a broader reference to South American presidential
democracies. At the beginning of the XXIth century, there are three clear clusters of countries
across the continent: at one extreme, Peru and Venezuela; at the opposite end, Chile and
Uruguay. Somewhere in the middle, lie the two countries I have defined as concentrationist
presidencies. So where are the delegative democracies? If the label is still useful –and I
believe it is—, it is more likely to define the regimes that allowed Fujimori and Chávez to
become presidents, rather than those that produced Menem and Collor de Mello.26 Argentina
and Brazil do show a significant degree of regime institutionalization –even if ‘other,’ to
paraphrase O’Donnell (1996). In contrast, Peru and Venezuela have undergone a process of
increasing de-institutionalization, whereas Chile and Uruguay are plausibly located along the
continuum running from separationist to concentrationist presidentialism. Further empirical
analysis should be carried out in order to improve or dismiss the qualitative typology I am
proposing, but my expectation is that such a typology will contribute to orienting future
research.
                                                
25 “Even though Argentine and Brazilian presidents may seem to obtain most of what they wish, it is
doubtful that they are institutionally less restricted than the prime ministers of Spain or Britain” (author’s
translation).
26 See Figueiredo (2000) for a coincident argument.
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Abstract
Presidentialism has been long defined as a regime type based on the principle of
separation of power. However, actual presidential systems have most of the times performed
on a very different basis, closer to concentration rather than separation of power: this is
especially the case in most Latin American countries. In shedding some light over such
mismatch, this article adopts a restricted definition of presidentialism and advances a typology
of democratic regimes, in order to thereafter apply it to the two largest South American
countries: Argentina and Brazil. Subsequently, these countries are located in a rank order
herein developed, to conclude by drawing some broader implications of the proposed
framework for both theory and practice of presidential government.
